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Abstract
For many decades, statisticians have made attempts to prepare the
Bayesian omelette without breaking the Bayesian eggs; that is, to obtain
probabilistic likelihood-based inferences without relying on informative
prior distributions. A recent example is Murray Aitkin’s recent book,
Statistical Inference, which presents an approach to statistical hypothesis
testing based on comparisons of posterior distributions of likelihoods un-
der competing models. Aitkin develops and illustrates his method using
some simple examples of inference from iid data and two-way tests of in-
dependence. We analyze in this note some consequences of the inferential
paradigm adopted therein, discussing why the approach is incompatible
with a Bayesian perspective and why we do not find it relevant for applied
work.
Keywords: Foundations, likelihood, Bayesian, Bayes factor, model choice, test-
ing of hypotheses, improper priors, coherence.
1 Introduction
For many decades, statisticians have made attempts to prepare the Bayesian
omelette without breaking the Bayesian eggs; that is, to obtain probabilistic
likelihood-based inferences without relying on informative prior distributions.
A recent example is Murray Aitkin’s recent book, Statistical Inference, which is
the culmination of a long research program on the topic of integrated evidence,
exemplified by the discussion paper of Aitkin (1991). The book, subtitled An
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Integrated Bayesian/Likelihood Approach, proposes handling statistical hypoth-
esis testing and model selection via comparisons of posterior distributions of
likelihood functions under the competing models or via the posterior distribu-
tion of the likelihood ratios corresponding to those models. (The essence of
the proposal is detailed in Section 2.) Instead of comparing Bayes factors or
performing posterior predictive checks (comparing observed data to posterior
replicated pseudo-datasets), Statistical Inference recommends a fusion between
likelihood and Bayesian paradigms that allows for the perpetuation of nonin-
formative priors in testing settings where standard Bayesian practice prohibits
their usage (DeGroot, 1973) or requires an extended decision-theoretic frame-
work (Bernardo, 2011). While we appreciate the considerable effort made by
Aitkin to place his theory within a Bayesian framework, we remain unconvinced
of the said coherence, for reasons exposed in this note.
Figure 1: Cover
of Statistical In-
ference
From our Bayesian perspective, and for several dis-
tinct reasons detailed in the present note, integrated
Bayesian/likelihood inference cannot fit within the philos-
ophy of Bayesian inference. Aitkin’s commendable attempt
at creating a framework that incorporate the use of arbitrary
noninformative priors in model choice procedures is thus in-
coherent in this Bayesian respect. When using improper
priors lead to meaningless Bayesian procedures for posterior
model comparison, we see this as a sign that the Bayesian
model will not work for the problem at hand. Rather than
trying at all cost to keep the offending model and define
marginal posterior probabilities by fiat (whether by BIC,
DIC, intrinsic Bayes factors, or posterior likelihoods), we
prefer to follow the full logic of Bayesian inference and rec-
ognize that, when one’s Bayesian approach leads to a dead
end, one must change either one’s methodologies or one’s be-
liefs (or both). Bayesians, both subjective and objective, have long recognized
the need for tuning, expanding, or otherwise altering a model in light of its pre-
dictions (see, for example, Good, 1950 and Jaynes, 2003), and we view undefined
Bayes factors as an example where otherwise useful methods are being extended
beyond their applicability. To try to work around such problems without alter-
ing the prior distribution is, we believe, an abandonment of Bayesian principles
and, more importantly, an abandoned opportunity for model improvement.
The criticisms found in the current review are therefore not limited to
Aitkin’s book; they also apply to previous patches such as the deviance informa-
tion criterion (DIC) of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) (which also uses a “posterior”
expectation of the log-likelihood) and the pseudo-posteriors of Geisser and Eddy
(1979)(which make an extensive use of the data in their product of predictives).
Unlike the author, who has felt the call to construct a partly new Aitkin,
1991 if tentatively unifying foundation for statistical inference, we have the
luxury of feeling that we already live in a comfortable (even if not flawless)
inferential house. Thus, we come to Aitkin’s book not with a perceived need
to rebuild but rather with a view toward strengthening the potential shakiness
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of the pillars that support our own inferences. A key question when looking
at any method for probabilistic inference that is not fully Bayesian is: For
the applied problems that interest us, does the proposed new approach achieve
better performances than our existing methods? Our answer, to which we arrive
after careful thought, is no.
As an evaluation of the ideas found in Statistical Inference, the criticisms
found in this review are inherently limited. We do not claim here that Aitkin’s
approach is wrong per se merely that it does not fit within our inferential
methodology, namely Bayesian statistics, despite using Bayesian tools. We ac-
knowledge that statistical methods do not, and most likely never will, form
a seamless logical structure. It may thus very well be that the approach of
comparing posterior distributions of likelihoods could be useful for some ac-
tual applications, and perhaps Aitkin’s book will inspire future researchers to
demonstrate this.
Statistical Inference begins with a crisp review of frequentist, likelihood and
Bayesian approaches to inference and then proceeds to the main issue: intro-
ducing the “integrated Bayes/likelihood approach”, first described in Chapter 2.
Much of the remaining methodological material appears in Chapters 4 (“Unified
analysis of finite populations”) and 7 (“Goodness of fit and model diagnostics”).
The remaining chapters apply Aitkin’s principles to various examples. The
present article discusses the basic ideas in Statistical Inference, then consider
the relevance of Aitkin’s methodology within the Bayesian paradigm.
2 A small change in the paradigm
2.1 Posterior likelihood
“This quite small change to standard Bayesian analysis allows a very gen-
eral approach to a wide range of apparently different inference problems;
a particular advantage of the approach is that it can use the same nonin-
formative priors.” Statistical Inference, page xiii
The “quite small change” advocated by Statistical Inference consists in en-
visioning the likelihood function L(θ, x) as a generic function of the parameter
θ that can be processed a posteriori (that is, with a distribution induced by the
posterior pi(θ|x)), hence allowing for (posterior) cdf, mean, variance and quan-
tiles. In particular, the central tool for Aitkin’s model fit is the “posterior cdf”
of the likelihood,
F (z) = Prpi(L(θ, x) > z|x) .
As argued by the author (Chapter 2, page 21), this “small change” in perspective
has several appealing features:
– The approach is general and allows to resolve the difficulties with the
Bayesian processing of point null hypotheses, being defined solely by the
Bayesian model associated with L(θ, x);
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– The approach allows for the use of generic noninformative and improper
priors, again by being relative to a single model;
– The approach handles more naturally the “vexed question of model fit”,
still for the same reason;
– The approach is “simple.”
As noted above, the setting is quite similar to Spiegelhalter et al.’s (2002) DIC
in that the deviance D(θ) = −2 log(f(x|θ)) is a renaming of the likelihood and
is considered “a posteriori” both in D¯ = E[D(θ)|x] and in pD = D¯ − D(θˆ),
where θˆ is a Bayesian estimator of θ, since
DIC = pD + D¯.
The discussion of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002) made this point clear, see in partic-
ular Dawid (2002), even though the authors disagreed. Plummer (2008) make
a similarly ambiguous proposal that also relates to Geisser and Eddy (1979) by
its usage of cross-validation quantities.
We however dispute both the appropriateness and the magnitude of the
change advocated in Statistical Inference and show below why, in our opinion,
this shift in paradigm constitutes a new branch of statistical inference, differing
from Bayesian analysis on many points. First, using priors and posteriors is no
guarantee that inference is Bayesian (Seidenfeld, 1992). Empirical Bayes tech-
niques are witnesses of this (Robbins, 1964, Carlin and Louis, 2008). Aitkin’s
key departure from Bayesian principles means that his procedure has to be vali-
dated on its own, rather than benefiting from the coherence inherent to Bayesian
procedures. The practical advantage of the likelihood/Bayesian approach may
be convenience, but the drawback is that the method pushes both the user and
the statistician away from progress in model building.1
We envision Bayesian data analysis as comprising three steps: (1) model
building, (2) inference, and (3) model checking. In particular, we view steps
(2) and (3) as separate. Inference works well, with many exciting developments
still in the coming, handling complex models, leading to an unlimited range
of applications, and a partial integration with classical approaches (as in the
empirical Bayes work of Efron and Morris, 1975, or more recently the similarities
between hierarchical Bayes and frequentist false discovery rates discussed by
1One might argue that, in practice, almost all Bayesians are subject to our criticism of
“using models that make nonsensical predictions.” For example, Gelman et al. (2003) and
Marin and Robert (2007) are full of noninformative priors. Our criticism here, though, is not
of noninformative priors in general but of incoherent predictions about quantities of interest.
In particular, noninformative priors can often (but not always!) give reasonable inferences
about parameters θ within a model, even while giving meaningless (or at least not universally
accepted) values for marginal likelihoods that are needed for Bayesian model comparison. It
does when interest shifts from Pr(θ|x,H) to Pr(H|x) that the Bayesian must set aside most
of noninformative pi(θ|H) and, perhaps reluctantly, set up an informative model. See, e.g.,
Liang et al. (2008) and Johnson and Rossell (2010) for some current perspectives on Bayesian
model choice using noninformative priors.
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Efron, 2010), causal inference, machine learning, and other aims and methods
of statistical inference.
Even in the face of all this progress on inference, Bayesian model checking
remains a bit of an anomaly, with the three leading Bayesian approaches be-
ing Bayes factors, posterior predictive checks, and comparisons of models based
on prediction error and other loss-based measures. (Decision-theoretic analy-
ses as in (Bernardo, 2011), while intellectually convincing, have not gained the
same amount of popularity.) Unfortunately, as Aitkin points out, none of these
model checking methods works completely smoothly: Bayes factors depend on
aspects of a model that are untestable and are commonly assigned arbitrarily;
posterior predictive checks are, in general, “conservative” in the sense of pro-
ducing p-values whose probability distributions are concentrated near 0.5; and
prediction error measures (which include cross-validation and DIC) require the
user to divide data into test and validation sets, lest they use the data twice (a
point discussed immediately below). The setting is even bleaker when trying to
incorporate noninformative priors (Gelman et al., 2003, Robert, 2001) and new
proposals are clearly of interest.
2.2 “Using the data twice”
“A persistent criticism of the posterior likelihood approach (...) has been
based on the claim that these approaches are ‘using the data twice,’ or are
‘violating temporal coherence.” Statistical Inference, page 48
“Using the data twice” is not our main reservation about the method—if
only because this is a rather vague concept. Obviously, one could criticize the
use of the “posterior expectation” of the likelihod as being the ratio of the
marginal of the twice replicated data over the marginal of the original data,
E[L(θ, x)|x] =
∫
L(θ, x)pi(θ|x) dθ = m(x, x)
m(x)
,
similar to Aitkin (1991) (a criticism clearly expressed in the discussion therein).
However, a more fundamental issue is that the “posterior” distribution of the
likelihood function cannot be justified from a Bayesian perspective. Statistical
Inference stays away from decision-theory (as stated on page xiv) so there is
no derivation based on a loss function or such. Our primary difficulty with the
integrated likelihood idea (and DIC as well) is (a) that the likelihood function
does not exist a priori and (b) that it requires a joint distribution to be properly
defined in the case of model comparison. The case for (a) is arguable, as Aitkin
would presumably contest that there exists a joint distribution on the likelihood,
even though the case of an improper prior stands out (see below). We still see
the concept of a posterior probability that the likelihood ratio is larger than
1 as meaningless. The case for (b) is more clear-cut in that when considering
two models, hence a likelihood ratio, a Bayesian analysis does require a joint
distribution on the two sets of parameters to reach a decision, even though in
the end only one set will be used. As detailed below in Section 4, this point is
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related with the introduction of pseudo-priors by Carlin and Chib (1995) who
needed arbitrary defined prior distributions on the parameters that do not exist.
In the specific case of an improper prior, Aitkin’s approach cannot be val-
idated in a probability setting for the reason that there is no joint probability
on (θ, x). Obviously, one could always advance that the whole issue is irrele-
vant since improper priors do not stand within probability theory. However,
improper priors do stand within the Bayesian framework, as demonstrated for
instance by Hartigan (1983) and it is easy to give those priors an exact meaning.
When the data are made of n iid observations xn = (x1, . . . , xn) from fθ and
an improper prior pi is used on θ, we can consider a training sample (Smith and
Spiegelhalter, 1982) x(l), with (l) ⊂ {1, ..., n} such that∫
f(x(l)|θ) dpi(θ) <∞ (l ≤ n).
If we construct a probability distribution on θ by
pix(l)(θ) ∝ pi(θ)f(x(l)|θ) ,
the posterior distribution associated with this distribution and the remainder
of the sample x(−l) is given by
pix(l)(θ|x(−l)) ∝ pi(θ)f(xn|θ), x(−l) = {xi, i /∈ (l)} .
This distribution is independent from the choice of the training sample; it only
depends on the likelihood of the whole data xn and it therefore leads to a
non-ambiguous posterior distribution2 on θ. However, as is well known, this
construction does not lead to produce a joint distribution on (xn, θ), which
would be required to give a meaning to Aitkin’s integrated likelihood. Therefore,
his approach cannot cover the case of improper priors within a probabilistic
framework and thus fails to solve the very difficulty with noninformative priors
it aimed at solving. This is further illustrated by the use of Haldane’s prior in
Chapter 4 of Statistical Inference, despite it not allowing for empty cells in a
contingency table (Jeffreys, 1939).
3 Posterior probability on the posterior proba-
bilities
“The p-value is equal to the posterior probability that the likelihood ra-
tio, for null hypothesis to alternative, is greater than 1 (...)The posterior
probability is p that the posterior probability of H0 is greater than 0.5.”
Statistical Inference, pages 42–43
2 Obvious extensions to the case of independent but non iid data or of exchangeable data
lead to the same interpretation. The case of dependent data is more delicate, but similar
interpretation can still be considered.
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Those two equivalent statements show that it is difficult to give a Bayesian
interpretation to Aitkin’s method, since the two “posterior probabilities” quoted
above are incompatible. Indeed, a fundamental Bayesian property is that the
posterior probability of an event related with the parameters of the model is
not a random quantity but a number. To consider the “posterior probability
of the posterior probability” means we are exiting the Bayesian domain, both
from logical and philosophical viewpoints.
In Chapter 2, Aitkin exposes his (foundational) reasons for choosing this
new approach by integrated Bayes/likelihood. His criticism of Bayes factors is
based on several points we feel useful to reproduce here:
(i). “Have we really eliminated the uncertainty about the model parameters
by integration? The integrated likelihood (...) is the expected value of the
likelihood. But what of the prior variance of the likelihood?” (page 47).
(ii). “Any expectation with respect to the prior implies that the data has not
yet been observed (...) So the “integrated likelihood” is the joint distribu-
tion of random variables drawn by a two-stage process. (...) The marginal
distribution of these random variables is not the same as the distribution
of Y (...) and does not bear on the question of the value of θ in that
population” (page 47).
(iii). “We cannot use an improper prior to compute the integrated likelihood.
This eliminate the usual improper noninformative priors widely used in
posterior inference.” (page 47).
(iv). “Any parameters in the priors (...) will affect the value of the integrated
likelihood and this effect does not disappear with increasing sample size”
(page 47).
(v). “The Bayes factor is equal to the posterior mean of the likelihood ratio
between the models” [meaning under the full model posterior] (page 48).
(vi). “The Bayes factor diverges as the prior becomes diffuse. (...) This prop-
erty of the Bayes factor has been known since the Lindley/Bartlett paradox
of 1957” (page 48).
The representation (i) of the “integrated” (or marginal) likelihood as an
expectation under the prior
m(x) =
∫
L(θ, x)pi(θ) dθ = Epi[L(θ, x)]
is unassailable and is for instance used as a starting point for motivating the
nested sampling method (Skilling, 2006, Chopin and Robert, 2010). This does
not imply that the extension to the variance or to any other moment stated
in (i) has a similar meaning, nor that the move to the expectation under the
posterior is valid within the Bayesian paradigm. While the difficulty (iii) with
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improper priors is real, and while the impact of the prior modelling (iv) may
have a lingering effect, the other points can be easily rejected on the ground
that the posterior distribution of the likelihood is meaningless within a Bayesian
perspective. This criticism is anticipated by Aitkin who protests on pages 48-49
that, given point (v), the posterior distribution must be “meaningful,” since
the posterior mean is “meaningful”, but the interpretation of the Bayes factor
as a “posterior mean” is only an interpretation of an existing integral (in the
specific case of nested models), it does not give any validation to the analysis.
(The marginal likelihood may similarly be interpreted as a prior mean, despite
depending on the observation x, as in the nested sampling perspective. More
generaly, bridge sampling techniques also exploit those multiple representations
of a ratio of integrals, Gelman and Meng, 1998.) One could just as well take
(ii) above as an argument against the integrated likelihood/Bayes perspective.
4 Products of posteriors
In the case of unrelated models to be compared, the fundamental theoretical
argument against using posterior distributions of the likelihoods and of related
terms is that the approach leads to parallel and separate simulations from the
posteriors under each model. Statistical Inference recommends that models be
compared via the distribution of the likelihood ratio values,
Li(θi|x)
/
Lk(θk|x),
where the θi’s and θk’s are drawn from the respective posteriors. This choice is
similar to Scott’s (2002) and to Congdon’s (2006) mistaken solutions exposed in
Robert and Marin (2008), in that MCMC simulations are run for each model sep-
arately and the resulting samples are then gathered together to produce either
the posterior expectation (in Scott’s, 2002, case) or the posterior distribution
(for the current paper) of
ρiL(θi|x)
/∑
k
ρkL(θk|x) ,
which do not correspond to genuine Bayesian solutions (see Robert and Marin,
2008). Again, this is not as much because the dataset x is used repeatedly in
this process (since reversible MCMC produces as well separate samples from
the different posteriors) as the fundamental lack of a common joint distribution
that is needed in the Bayesian framework. This means, e.g., that the integrated
likelihood/Bayes technology is producing samples from the product of the pos-
teriors (a product that clearly is not defined in a Bayesian framework) instead
of using pseudo-priors as in Carlin and Chib (1995), i.e. of considering a joint
posterior on (θ1, θ2), which is [proportional to]
p1m1(x)pi1(θ1|x)pi2(θ2) + p2m2(x)pi2(θ2|x)pi1(θ1). (1)
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This makes a difference in the outcome, as illustrated in Figure 2, which com-
pares the distribution of the likelihood ratio under the true posterior and under
the product of posteriors, when assessing the fit of a Poisson model against the
fit of a binomial model with m = 5 trials, for the observation x = 3. The joint
simulation produces a much more supportive argument in favor of the binomial
model, when compared with the product of the posteriors. (Again, this is inher-
ently the flaw found in the reasoning leading to Scott’s, 2002, and Congdon’s,
2006, methods for approximating Bayes factors.)
Marginal simulation
log likelihood ratio
−4 −2 0 2
Joint simulation
log likelihood ratio
−15 −10 −5 0
Figure 2: Comparison of the distribution of the likelihood ratio under the cor-
rect joint posterior and under the product of the model-based posteriors, when
assessing a Poisson model against a binomial with m = 5 trials, for x = 3.
The joint simulation produces a much more supportive argument in favor of the
negative binomial model, when compared with the product of the posteriors.
Although we do not advocate its use, a Bayesian version of Aitkin’s proposal
can be constructed based on the following loss function that evaluates the esti-
mation of the model index j based on the values of the parameters under both
models and on the observation x:
L(δ, (j, θj , θ−j)) = Iδ=1If2(x|θ2)>f1(x|θ1) + Iδ=2If2(x|θ2)<f1(x|θ1) . (2)
Here δ = j means that model j is chosen, and fj(.|θj) denotes the likelihood
under model j. Under this loss, the Bayes (optimal) solution is
δpi(x) =
{
1 if Prpi [f2(x|θ2) < f1(x|θ1)|x] > 1/2
2 otherwise,
which depends on the joint posterior distribution (1) on (θ1, θ2), thus differs
from Aitkin’s solution. We have
Prpi [f2(x|θ2) < f1(x|θ1)|x] =pi(M1|x)
∫
Θ2
Prpi1
[
l1(θ1) > l
2(θ2)|x, θ2
]
dpi2(θ2)
+ pi(M2|x)
∫
Θ1
Prpi2
[
l1(θ1) > l
2(θ2)|x, θ1
]
dpi1(θ1) ,
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where l1 and l2 denote the log-likelihoods and where the probabilities within
the integrals are computed under pi1(θ1|x) and pi2(θ2|x), respectively. (Pseudo-
priors as in Carlin and Chib, 1995 could be used instead of the true priors, a
requirement when at least one of those priors is improper.)
An asymptotic evaluation of the above procedure is possible: consider a
sample of size n, xn. If M1 is the “true” model, then pi(M1|xn) = 1 + op(1)
and we have
Prpi1
[
l1(θ1) > l
2(θ2)|xn, θ2
]
= Pr
[
−X 2p1 > l2(θ2)− l2(θˆ1)
]
+Op(1/
√
n)
= Fp1
[
l1(θˆ1)− l2(θ2)
]
+Op(1/
√
n) ,
with obvious notations for the corresponding log-likelihoods, p1 the dimension
of Θ1, θˆ1 the maximum likelihood estimator of θ1, and X 2p1 a chi-square random
variable with p1 degrees of freedom. Note also that, since l
2(θ2) ≤ l2(θˆ2),
l1(θˆ1)− l2(θ2) ≥ nKL(f0, fθ∗2 ) +Op(
√
n) ,
where KL(f, g) denotes the Kullback–Leibler divergence and θ∗2 denotes the
projection of the true model on M2 : θ∗2 = argminθ2KL(f0, fθ2), we have
Prpi [f(xn|θ2) < f(xn|θ1)|xn] = 1 + op(1) .
By symmetry, the same asymptotic consistency occurs under model M2. On
the opposite, Aitkin’s approach leads (at least in regular models) to the approx-
imation
Pr[X 2p2 −X 2p1 > l2(θˆ2)− l1(θˆ1)],
where the X 2p2 and X 2p1 random variables are independent, hence producing quite
a different result that depends on the asymptotic behavior of the likelihood ratio.
Note that for both approaches to be equivalent one would need a pseudo-prior
for M2 (resp. M1 if M2 were true) as tight around the maximum likelihood
as the posterior pi2(θ2|xn), which would be equivalent to some kind of empirical
Bayes type of procedure.
Furthermore, in the case of embedded models,M2 andM1 ⊂M2, Aitkin’s
approach can be given a probabilistic interpretation. To this effect, we write the
parameter under M1 as (θ1, ψ0), ψ0 being a fixed known quantity, and under
M2 as θ2 = (θ1, ψ), so that comparingM1 withM2 corresponds to testing the
null hypothesis ψ = ψ0. Aitkin does not impose a positive prior probability on
M1, since his prior only bears on M2 (in a spirit close to the Savage-Dickey
representation, see Marin and Robert, 2010). His approach is therefore similar
to the inversion of a confidence region into a testing procedure (or vice-versa).
Under the modelM1 ⊂M2, denoting by l(θ, ψ) the log-likelihood of the bigger
model,
Prpi [l(θ1, ψ0) > l(θ1, ψ)|xn] ≈ Pr
[
X 2p2−p1 > −l(θˆ1(ψ0), ψ0) + l(θˆ1, ψˆ)
]
≈ 1− Fp2−p1 [−l(θˆ1(ψ0), ψ0) + l(θˆ1, ψˆ)],
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which is the approximate p-value associated with the likelihood ratio test. There-
fore, the aim of this approach seems to be, at least for embedded models where
the Bernstein–von Mises theorem holds for the posterior distribution, to con-
struct a Bayesian procedure reproducing the p-value associated with the likeli-
hood ratio test. From a frequentist point of view it is of interest to see that the
posterior probability of the likelihood ratio being greater than one is approxi-
mately a p-value, at least in cases when the Bernstein-von Mises theorem holds,
e.g. for embedded models and proper priors. This p-value can then be given
a finite-sample meaning (under the above restrictions), however it seems more
interesting from a frequentist perspective than from a Bayesian one.3 From a
Bayesian decision-theoretic viewpoint, this is even more dubious, since the loss
function (2) is difficult to interpret and to justify.
“Without a specific alternative, the best we can do is to make posterior
probability statements about µ and transfer these to the posterior distribu-
tion of the likelihood ratio (..) There cannot be strong evidence in favor
of a point null hypothesis against a general alternative hypothesis.” Sta-
tistical Inference, pages 42–44
We further note that, once Statistical Inference has set the principle of using
the posterior distribution of the likelihood ratio (or rather of the divergence
difference since this is at least symmetric in both hypotheses), there is a whole
range of outputs available including confidence intervals on the difference, for
checking whether or not they contain zero. From our (Bayesian) perspective,
this solution (a) is not Bayesian for reasons exposed above, (b) is not parame-
terization invariant, and (c) relies once again on an arbitrary confidence level.
5 Misrepresentations
We have focused in this review on Aitkin’s proposals rather than on his char-
acterizations of other statistical methods. In a few places, however, we believe
that there have been some unfortunate confusions from his part.
On page 22, Aitkin describes Bayesian posterior distributions as “formally a
measure of personal uncertainty about the model parameter,” a statement that
we believe holds generally only under a definition of “personal” that is so broad
as to be meaningless. As we have discussed elsewhere (Gelman, 2008), Bayesian
probabilities can be viewed as “subjective” or “personal” but this is not neces-
sary. Or, to put it another way, if you want to label my posterior distribution as
“personal” because it is based on my personal choice of prior distribution, you
should also label inferences from the proportional hazards model as “personal”
because it is based on the user’s choice of the parameterization of Cox (1972);
you should also label any linear regression (classical or otherwise) as “personal”
as based on the individual’s choice of predictors and assumptions of additivity,
linearity, variance function, and error distribution; and so on for all but the very
simplest models in existence.
3See Chapter 7 of Gelman et al. (2003) for a fully Bayesian treatment of finite-sample
inference.
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In a nearly century-long tradition in statistics, any probability model is
sharply divided into “likelihood” (which is considered to be objective and, in
textbook presentations, is often simply given as part of the mathematical spec-
ification of the problem) and “prior” (a dangerously subjective entity to which
the statistical researcher is encouraged to pour all of his or her pent-up skep-
ticism). This may be a tradition but it has no logical basis. If writers such as
Aitkin wish to consider their likelihoods as objective and consider their priors as
subjective, that is their privilege. But we would prefer them to restrain them-
selves when characterizing the models as others. It would be polite to either
tentatively accept the objectivity of others’ models or, contrariwise, to gallantly
affirm the subjectivity of one’s own choices.
Aitkin also mischaracterizes hierarchical models, writing “It is important
not to interpret the prior as in some sense a model for nature [italics in the
original] that nature has used a random process to draw a parameter value from
a higher distribution of parameter values . . . ” On the contrary, that is exactly
how we interpret the prior distribution in the ideal case. Admittedly, we do
not generally approach this ideal (except in settings such as genetics where the
population distribution of parameters has a clear sampling distribution), just
as in practice the error terms in our regression models do not capture the true
distribution of errors. Despite these imperfections, we believe that it can often
be helpful to interpret the prior as a model for the parameter-generation process
and to improve this model where appropriate.
6 Contributions of the book
Statistical Inference points out several important facts that are individually
known well (but perhaps not well enough!), but by putting them all in one
place it foregrounds the difficulty or impossibility of putting all the different
approaches to model checking in one place. We all know that the p-value is in
no way the posterior probability of a null hypothesis being true; in addition,
Bayes factors as generally practiced correspond to no actual probability model.
Also, it is well-known that the so-called harmonic mean approach to calculating
Bayes factors is inherently unstable, to the extent that in the situations where
it does “work,” it works by implicitly integrating over a space different from
that of its nominal model.
Yes, we all know these things, but as is often the case with scientific anoma-
lies, they are associated with such a high level of discomfort that many re-
searchers tend to forget the problems or try to finesse them. It is refreshing to
see the anomalies laid out so clearly.
At some points, however, Aitkin disappoints. For example, at the end of Sec-
tion 7.2, he writes: “In the remaining sections of this chapter, we first consider
the posterior predictive p-value and point out difficulties with the posterior pre-
dictive distribution which closely parallel those of Bayes factors.” He follows up
with a section entitled “The posterior predictive distribution,” which concludes
with an example that he writes “should be a matter of serious concern [em-
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phasis in original] to those using posterior predictive distributions for predictive
probability statements.”
What is this example of serious concern? It is an imaginary problem in which
he observes 1 success in 10 independent trials and then is asked to compute the
probability of getting at most 2 successes in 20 more trials from the same pro-
cess. Statistical Inference assumes a uniform prior distribution on the success
probability and yields a predictive probability or 0.447, which, to him, “looks a
vastly optimistic and unsound statement.” Here, we think Aitkin should take
Bayes a bit more seriously. If you think this predictive probability is unsound,
there should be some aspect of the prior distribution or the likelihood that is
unsound as well. This is what Good (1950) called “the device of imaginary re-
sults.” We suggest that, rather than abandoning highly effective methods based
on predictive distributions, Aitkin should look more carefully at his predictive
distributions and either alter his model to fit his intuitions, alter his intuitions
to fit his model, or do a bit of both. This is the value of inferential coherence
as an ideal.
7 Solving non-problems
Several of the examples in Statistical Inference represent solutions to problems
that seem to us to be artificial or conventional tasks with no clear analogy to
applied work.
“They are artificial and are expressed in terms of a survey of 100 indi-
viduals expressing support (Yes/No) for the president, before and after a
presidential address (...) The question of interest is whether there has been
a change in support between the surveys (...). We want to assess the evi-
dence for the hypothesis of equality H1 against the alternative hypothesis
H2 of a change.” Statistical Inference, page 147
Based on our experience in public opinion research, this is not a real question.
Support for any political position is always changing. The real question is how
much the support has changed, or perhaps how this change is distributed across
the population.
A defender of Aitkin (and of classical hypothesis testing) might respond at
this point that, yes, everybody knows that changes are never exactly zero and
that we should take a more “grown-up” view of the null hypothesis, not that the
change is zero but that it is nearly zero. Unfortunately, the metaphorical inter-
pretation of hypothesis tests has problems similar to the theological doctrines
of the Unitarian church. Once you have abandoned literal belief in the Bible,
the question soon arises: why follow it at all? Similarly, once one recognizes
the inappropriateness of the point null hypothesis, it makes more sense not to
try to rehabilitate it or treat it as treasured metaphor but rather to attack our
statistical problems directly, in this case by performing inference on the change
in opinion in the population.
To be clear: we are not denying the value of hypothesis testing. In this
example, we find it completely reasonable to ask whether observed changes
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are statistically significant, i.e. whether the data are consistent with a null
hypothesis of zero change. What we do not find reasonable is the statement
that “the question of interest is whether there has been a change in support.”
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Figure 3: (a) Hypothetical graph of presidential approval with discrete jumps;
(b) presidential approval series (for George W. Bush) showing movement at
many different time scales. If the approval series looked like the graph on the
left, then Aitkin’s “question of interest” of “whether there has been a change in
support between the surveys” would be completely reasonable. In the context of
actual public opinion data, the question does not make sense; instead, we prefer
to think of presidential approval as a continuously-varying process.
All this is application-specific. Suppose public opinion was observed to really
be flat, punctuated by occasional changes, as in the left graph in Figure 3. In
that case, Aitkin’s question of “whether there has been a change” would be
well-defined and appropriate, in that we could interpret the null hypothesis of
no change as some minimal level of baseline variation.
Real public opinion, however, does not look like baseline noise plus jumps,
but rather shows continuous movement on many time scales at once, as can be
seen from the right graph in Figure 3, which shows actual presidential approval
data. In this example, we do not see Aitkin’s question as at all reasonable. Any
attempt to work with a null hypothesis of opinion stability will be inherently
arbitrary. It would make much more sense to model opinion as a continuously-
varying process.
The statistical problem here is not merely that the null hypothesis of zero
change is nonsensical; it is that the null is in no sense a reasonable approximation
to any interesting model. The sociological problem is that, from Savage (1954)
onward, many Bayesians have felt the need to mimic the classical null-hypothesis
testing framework, even where it makes no sense. Aitkin is unfortunately no
exception, taking a straightforward statistical question—estimating a time trend
in opinion—and re-expressing it as an abstracted hypothesis testing problem
that pulls the analyst away from any interesting political questions.
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8 Conclusion: Why did we write this review?
“The posterior has a non-integrable spike at zero. This is equivalent to
assigning zero prior probability to these unobserved values.” Statistical
Inference, page 98
A skeptical (or even not so skeptical) reader might at this point ask, Why did
we bother to write a detailed review of a somewhat obscure statistical method
that we do not even like? Our motivation surely was not to protect the world
from a dangerous idea; if anything, we suspect our review will interest some
readers who otherwise would not have heard about the approach (as previously
illustrated by Robert, 2010).
In 1970, a book such as Statistical Inference could have had a large influence
in statistics. As Aitkin notes in his preface, there was a resurgence of interest in
the foundations of statistics around that time, with Lindley, Dempster, Barnard,
and others writing about the intersections between classical and Bayesian infer-
ence (going beyond the long-understood results of asymptotic equivalence) and
researchers such as Akaike and Mallows beginning to integrate model-based and
predictive approaches to inference. A glance at the influential text of Cox and
Hinkley (1974) reveals that theoretical statistics at that time was focused on
inference from independent data from specified sampling distributions (possi-
bly after discarding information, as in rank-based tests), and “likelihood” was
central to all these discussions.
Forty years on, a book on likelihood inference is more of a niche item. Partly
this is simply part of the growth of the field—with the proliferation of books,
journals, and online publications, it is much more difficult for any single book
to gain prominence. More than that, though, we think statistical theory has
moved away from iid analysis, toward more complex, structured problems.
That said, the foundational problems that Statistical Inference discusses are
indeed important and they have not yet been resolved. As models get larger,
the problem of “nuisance parameters” is revealed to be not a mere nuisance but
rather a central fact in all methods of statistical inference. As noted above,
Aitkin makes valuable points—known, but not well-enough known—about the
difficulties of Bayes factors, pure likelihood, and other superficially attractive
approaches to model comparison. We believe it is a natural continuation of this
work to point out the problems of the integrated likelihood approach as well.
For now, we recommend model expansion, Bayes factors where reasonable,
cross-validation, and predictive model checking based on graphics rather than
p-values. We recognize that each of these approaches has loose ends. But,
as practical idealists, we consider inferential challenges to be opportunities for
model improvement with the Bayesian realm rather than motivations for a new
theory of noninformative priors that takes us in uncharted territories.
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